It is a bit of a "run" down memory lane reading the posts here. A few moons ago (and many declassified years late), my past career included aerospace employment on selected programs where there were Pentagon waivers to allow the use of certain selected material(s) in selected programs. The F35 program continues with this tradition, I am sure.
Much of the A-10 early development included sourced material (i.e., titanium) from the USSR. Each airframe using 1,200 pounds (540 kg), meant the CIA/Others ran operations to secure what was needed before it was discovered where and by whom it was to be used. At times, Taiwan may have served as a "conduit" to transfer selected materials needed to produce certain items.
Imagine a task where the work involved Classified US patents where protection was provided under a secrecy order (i.e., no official award of a patent, restrictions on filing for a foreign patent, and mandates that an invention be kept secret).
Early Space Shuttle/Space Lab projects used the near zero vibration of space to perfect sub-micron metallization Hybrid/Chip standards which were often sent to special locations (upon the Space Lab's return) to complete the balance of the item build. Yes, the Space Lab had a small wafer lab on-board to perfect the early sub-micron metallization steps on the silicon substrate. The key question that was often asked and needed to answered was: How and where can "standards" be created and utilized to insure the accuracy of production units?
A prime example of establishing technology standards can be studied by a review of the US National Bureau of Standards (NBS); which was founded by Congress on March 3, 1901 ("as an authoritative domestic measurement and standards laboratory"). The wafer labs that are now producing sub-micron chips in environmentally controlled sites have been producing chips less than .3 micron, using HEPA filters for many years of sourced materials from various global locations.
Often, by the time an unfriendly country learns about a resource being obtained by it's foe, the program had already obtained more than 10X it's need for said material. No matter, Americans and friends of the U.S. should not get to concerned about this "F35 information leak" as I believe it to be a bit "controlled", after Lockheed Martin's initial denial.
Nonetheless, every defense entity in my past employment has been under one or more of the following export control regulations: The U.S. Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the U.S. Department of State International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC).
Therefore, now that China is aware that it has supplied an alloy used to make the magnets that are integrated into F-35 turbomachine pumps, China will never get the purchased raw material back or get it's hands on the finished product.
